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The study investigates the existence of fly-paper effect in 
municipal financing in Slovenia. Namely, one of the draw-
backs associated with decentralisation is that local authori-
ties’ own-source revenues may not be sufficient to finance 
the provision of goods and services, which gives a ration-
ale for central government to pay transfers to the lower 
levels of government. It is the most common example of 
intergovernmental transfers, called financial equalisation. 
Nevertheless, one of potentially negative effects of finan-
cial equalisation is the so-called fly-paper effect, as the 
empirical findings have shown that lump-sum transfers of 
central government tend to have greater stimulatory effect 
on local government spending than the equivalent increase 
in the income of the median voter. In essence, this means 
that transfer money »sticks where it hits«. The results of 
an analysis performed for Slovenian municipalities tend to 
support the existence of the effect in municipal financing.
* Primož Pevcin, assistant professor at the Faculty of Administration, University of 
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1. Introduction
(Fiscal) decentralization is a contemporary concept of administrative re-
form, which in practice denotes a process of transferring resources and ad-
ministrative powers to the lower levels of government, the anticipated effect 
being the increase in efficiency of goods and services provision. However, 
it should be acknowledged that issues related to the appropriate creation 
of local jurisdictions and their financing system are also very important in 
achieving efficiency gains related to decentralisation. Namely, decentraliza-
tion also has certain potentially negative effects, one of them being associ-
ated with inappropriate financing system causing fly-paper effect. Fly-paper 
effect denotes a phenomenon of intergovernmental transfers, in particular 
from central to lower levels of government, inflating local government ex-
penditures. In this context, the purpose of the paper is to assess the prob-
lems associated with decentralisation and the formation of local authorities. 
Further, the main goal of the paper is to empirically investigate the exist-
ence of fly-paper effect, one of the negative impacts of decentralisation as-
sociated with the presence of intergovernmental transfers, in the financing 
system of Slovenian municipalities, given the fact that intergovernmental 
transfers tended to play a very important role in financing. The paper is 
organised as follows: Chapter 2 describes the economic, political and fiscal 
effects of decentralised administration, Chapter 3 outlines the perspectives 
on local authority formation, and Chapter 4 discusses the financing of local 
authorities in the context of fly-paper effect. Chapter 5 briefly describes 
the system of municipal organisation and financing in Slovenia, whereas 
Chapter 6 presents the methodology and findings of empirical research on 
the existence of fly-paper effect in municipal financing, followed by brief 
concluding reflections and the list of references.  
2. Economic, Political and Fiscal Effects of 
Decentralisation
Decentralization is a contemporary concept of how to change the opera-
tions of public administration in order to achieve greater efficiency. The 
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process of decentralisation is in practice also related to certain socioeco-
nomic factors, such as to the country’s size and its economic develop-
ment, cultural and ethnic diversity of society, the level of democracy, etc. 
(more in Panizza, 1997). Historically, countries have had widely differ-
ent experiences with the introduction of the decentralisation concept.1 In 
short, the anticipated effects of decentralization primarily include greater 
efficiency in providing services, greater political stability, and a strong-
er political role for marginalised social groups. However, there are also 
certain limitations that hinder the implementation of decentralisation in 
practice, usually the main obstacle being human factor (van der Walle, 
2002). Namely, elected politicians and officials often dread decentralisa-
tion because of the potential danger of losing their decision-making pow-
ers; and wealthier classes are afraid of income redistribution and higher 
taxes, which are frequently associated with decentralisation.
Nevertheless, the literature portrays numerous advantages that decen-
tralisation should foster and that can be generally described as achieving 
greater allocative efficiency. For instance, according to Oates’ decentrali-
sation theorem, decentralisation and the related establishment of local 
authorities should contribute to greater prosperity, as it (Pareto efficient-
ly) decreases the deadweight loss of the consumer surplus (Bailey, 1999). 
The reason for greater efficiency also lies in the better knowledge and 
subsequent greater ability to fulfil diverse preferences. Moreover, the so-
called “geographical proximity effect” states that the level of information 
on production costs of public goods and services is higher at the local 
level, and at the same time, the variance of marginal costs of public goods 
and services has a negative correlation with the size of local authorities 
(Gilbert and Picard, 1996), which should result in greater efficiency of 
decentralised administration. Finally, decentralisation should have a posi-
tive effect on the voters’ political participation (Borck, 2002). The reason 
for this lies in the fact that at the local level, individual voters have greater 
influence on the outcome of the political decision-making because their 
votes carry relatively more weight. Consequently, greater political par-
ticipation implicitly results in greater political accountability of the local 
authorities as well, because decentralisation increases the voters’ control 
over the politicians and thus limits their political power and arbitrariness 
(more in Seabright, 1996). Besides, voters can evaluate the relative per-
formance of policies in different regions or communities, which means 
1  For instance, strong administrative centralisation is typical of undeveloped coun-
tries, to a great extent owing to the past socioeconomic relations and development levels.
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that voters can effectively reduce political rents by using retrospective vot-
ing strategies (Wrede, 2001).
It should also be acknowledged that decentralisation has certain negative 
effects, which can be generally described as greater technical inefficiency 
of decentralised administration. For instance, the main drawback of de-
centralised administration lies in the potentially lost economies of scale 
(Bailey, 1999). In centralised administration, economies of scale are sup-
posed to be created due to the possibility of production specialisation, 
as well as lower administrative costs.2 Besides, the problem of the spill 
over effects and their internalisation arises in decentralised administra-
tion, which is typical for goods with important spatial externalities (e.g., 
health care and tertiary education). Local authorities are often unable to 
perceive the positive effects, meaning that they do not take them into ac-
count when making decisions (Gilbert and Picard, 1996). Moreover, given 
the idea that decentralisation should have a positive effect on the voters’ 
political participation, it would therefore also have a negative effect on 
public finances. The size of the electoral base has a negative correlation 
with voters’ participation at the elections, in which one must not over-
look the fact that voting participation is a normal good3 (Borck, 2002). In 
practice, this means that in a centralised system the participation of voters 
is smaller, and the ones voting are usually wealthier; implicitly, this sug-
gests less of the desired redistribution and thus a smaller scope of public 
finance in a centralised administrative system. Finally, empirical literature 
stresses further potential weakness of decentralised administration in the 
form of so-called »flypaper effect« (Brennan and Pincus, 1996), which 
refers to the fact that transfer payments to the local authorities have a 
greater effect on the scope of local finances than the equivalent increase 
in private production (more in Strumpf, 1998).
To summarise, there are two main approaches on the effects of decen-
tralisation (Briem, 1998). The first is public choice approach based on 
Tiebout (1956) theory. This theory is based on the premise of »voting with 
feet«, meaning that voters select local jurisdiction, where their individual 
preferences in tax and service mix are best met. This should induce com-
petition among local jurisdictions for taxpayers and finally result in more 
efficient provision of public services. In contrast, the competing theory 
2  The economies of scale are particularly relevant for infrastructure intensive activi-
ties, such as for example water and sewerage (Fox and Gurley, 2006).
3  This means that the demand for voting participation increases with the voter’s 
income.
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stresses that excess fragmentation of government leads to inefficiencies in 
the provision of local public services, such as various duplications, problems 
in achieving economies of scale etc. In short, these competing views can be 
put in the context of Oates (1972), who states that the trade-off of decen-
tralised government structure is between lost economies of scale and prob-
lems with internalisation of externalities and spill-over effects on the one 
hand, and better matching of services levels to preferences on the other.4
As already noted, decentralisation should also affect government spend-
ing. Basically, the effect of decentralization on the scope of public expen-
ditures depends on whether the allocation efficiency exceeds the techno-
logical inefficiency. There are several main hypotheses in the literature with 
regard to the relation between political decentralization and the scope of 
public expenditure (de Mello, 1999). First, Wallis’ hypothesis stresses that 
decentralisation increases the amount of expenditures of local authorities, 
since the emphasis on the local provision of goods and services increases 
the demand for public goods provided by the local authorities because the 
latter have a better knowledge of the local preferences.5 Second, Brennan 
and Buchanan’s decentralisation hypothesis states that greater decision-
making autonomy is associated with greater autonomy of fixing tax bases 
and rates but, in imposing taxes, local authorities are limited by the mobil-
ity of production factors. In practice, this means that the local authorities’ 
competition for mobile taxpayers and other economic resources limits the 
power of these authorities and encourages a more cost-efficient provision 
of public goods.6 
Third, contrary to decentralisation hypothesis, Brennan and Buchanan’s 
collusion hypothesis states that decentralisation encourages the “con-
spiracy” of the local authorities and increases their expenditures, if de-
centralisation does not support competition between local authorities. In 
this case, local authorities seek to finance local expenditures through a 
larger share of public expenditures of the central authorities, which ena-
4  In particular, Besley and Coate (2003) argue that centralised structure of govern-
ment is preferred when the public good preferences of the median voter are similar across 
local jurisdictions and spill-over effects are large. Specifically, Konishi (2009) contemplates 
that centralisation is more viable if the efficiency gain from internalisation of cross-jurisdic-
tional spill-overs outweighs the losses from uniform policy-making.
5  Hypothesis also envisages that the increased public expenditures of local communi-
ties result in a simultaneous decrease in expenditure of the central authorities.
6  This notion is based on Tiebout (1956) theory, based on the premise of »voting with 
feet«, which should ultimately result in smaller overall size of government.
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bles them to increase local revenues and expenditures beyond the limits 
achievable in a competitive environment. This hypothesis is also related 
to the fiscal illusion hypothesis, which portrays the negative effects of 
revenue sharing; if the financing of local authorities focuses on the rev-
enue sharing, local authorities will probably tend to use their own funds 
to a lesser extent and increase the use of national funds.7 The reason for 
this lies in the fact that the financing costs can be distributed nationally, 
whereas the benefits are allocated to a specific local community, which 
also brings additional political points to the local authorities. In this case, 
the dependence of local authorities on the transfer expenditures allocated 
by the central government causes the local authorities to inflate their ex-
penditures because they are afraid of losing these funds. In other words, 
in this particular case, decentralisation itself creates a flypaper effect.
3. Decentralisation and Local Authority Formation
The previous chapter has demonstrated that decentralisation has both 
positive and negative effects. In general, one could claim that, despite 
everything, decentralisation is useful, but an optimal scope of decentrali-
sation must be found in practice. This means that both excessive cen-
tralisation and decentralisation should be avoided. In reality, the optimal 
scope of decentralization depends on two elements – that is, the scope of 
uncertainty about the costs of public goods and the scope of uncertainty 
about the spill-over effects (the positive spatial externalities) of public 
goods (Gilbert and Picard, 1996). Moreover, the authors argue that the 
greater the accuracy of information on the positive externalities, the more 
desirable should be decentralisation in practice. Inversely, the greater the 
accuracy of the information on costs, the more desired should be centrali-
zation in practice. They explain the relation above completely intuitively: 
the more accurate the information on the costs of public goods and servic-
es, the smaller is the producers’ information rent; that is why it is optimal 
to place greater emphasis on the internalisation of positive externalities, 
which can only be achieved through greater centralisation.8 
7  This kind of »grant« provided by the state budget has a rather negative incentive 
effect on the local authorities securing their own funds.  
8  If the effects of positive externalities are less uncertain, it makes sense to place 
greater emphasis on the reduction of information rent, which can be achieved more easily 
through decentralisation. In addition, Gilbert and Picard (1996) also provide the example of 
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Moreover, the issue of optimal decentralisation is also related to local 
authority formation. Public economics theory can be useful in providing 
the framework for determining the optimal size of local units, although we 
should be aware that economic recommendations are based on modelling, 
which is again based on a number of limitations. Nevertheless, the main 
idea of the theory is to induce policy making by revealing and describing 
the factors that affect the optimal size of local jurisdictions. In particular, 
the existing economic literature on country formation and break-up is 
particularly relevant for formation and dissolution of local jurisdictions, 
especially the so-called marginalist models, which state that marginal ad-
justments in the borders of jurisdictions are based predominantly on eco-
nomic factors (Drazen, 2000). 
A specific question in local government economic theory is what deter-
mines the number of local jurisdictions. In this context, Alesina, Baqir 
and Hoxby (2004) argue that the number of local jurisdictions in posi-
tively related to both social and economic heterogeneity of society, mean-
ing that citizens are obviously willing to sacrifice economies of scale to 
avoid heterogeneity in their local jurisdictions. Nevertheless, Baqir (2002) 
points out that the greater the number of local jurisdictions the larger the 
size of government, meaning that each additional unit of local govern-
ment causes rise in overspending bias. Namely, as Holzer et al. (2009) 
describe, there is a non-linear relationship between the number (size) of 
local jurisdictions and their performance, since too large local units expe-
rience diseconomies of scale and too small units are not able to achieve 
economies of scale.9 In particular, economies of scale are persistent in 
capital-intensive services of local jurisdictions, those being, for example, 
water provision and rural road maintenance, meaning that larger local 
government units can provide them more efficiently. In contrast, smaller 
local government units deliver labour-intensive services more efficiently 
(for example, police and fire protection, refuse collection, public educa-
educational system as a special form of (local) public good with significant positive externali-
ties. They argue that in practice, centralisation of administration, especially the jurisdiction 
over capital expenditures, frequently increases from lower to higher levels of education as the 
higher levels of education have larger positive (spatial) externalities at the national level. 
9  They point out that the most efficient size of local units is in the range of population 
from 25 thousand to 250 thousand.
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tion etc.), since those services do not exhibit significant economies of 
scale.10 
Nonetheless, the issue of financial vulnerability of smaller municipalities, 
particularly in economically disadvantaged areas, should also be taken into 
consideration, given that generally the size of municipalities is relatively 
small in the majority of countries, and below the previously described op-
timal levels. This means that the costs of those municipalities are higher in 
per capita terms, thereby creating basis for grant allocation. These issues 
are thoroughly discussed in the following chapters.
4.  The Economic Characteristics of 
Intergovernmental Transfers and Fly-paper 
Effect
As already noted, one of the drawbacks of decentralisation is the possi-
ble existence of fly-paper effect. Namely, local authorities’ own resources 
may not be sufficient to finance the provision of the services that certain 
authority is obliged to deliver. This provides a rationale for central govern-
ment to pay transfers to the lower levels of government in order to prevent 
either too low levels of service provision at the local level, or to prevent 
local taxes from becoming too high. In general, central government trans-
fers usually want to compensate for relatively high expenditure needs that 
are associated with relatively low taxable resources per capita, the purpose 
being to prevent fiscal stress. In this case, the most common example of 
transfers is associated with the concept of financial equalisation (Bailey, 
1999). 
Both economic and social rationale exist for introduction of financial 
equalisation, such as a relatively small size of local communities in many 
countries, which causes tax exporting and consequently, allocative inef-
ficiencies, limited scope for user-charging due to the potentially negative 
social impacts and high collection costs, not to mention the directives of 
the European Charter of Local Self-Government (1985), which in Article 
9 supports the institution of financial equalisation that ought to correct 
10  It should be noted that the literature points out that, on average, over 80 per cent 
of local jurisdiction services are of labour-intensive and routine nature (Katsuyama, 2003). 
Accordingly, the author stresses that allocative issues, such as management of resources, are 
more important than technical efficiencies, such as economies of scale.
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the effects of unequal distribution of potential financial sources and bur-
dens of local authorities. In theory, there are two distinct forms of finan-
cial equalisation: equalisation of local taxable resources per capita and 
equalisation of local expenditure needs per capita. The former perceives 
that uneven distribution of economic activities causes variations in the 
ability to collect local taxes, whereas the latter perceives that variations 
exist in the spending needs per capita due to the socioeconomic, demo-
graphic, geographic and other differences between local communities.11 
Nevertheless, one of the potentially negative effects of financial equali-
sation is the so-called fly-paper effect, since the empirical findings have 
shown that lump-sum transfers of central government tend to have great-
er stimulatory effect on local government spending than the equivalent 
increase in the income of the median voter.12 This means that fly-paper 
effect actually contradicts traditional theory of grants-in-aid of exhaustive 
governmental expenditures (see Bradford and Oates, 1971; Bailey, 1999), 
which is based on median voter theorem of public choice. Namely, this 
theorem states that intergovernmental transfers and voter income should 
have identical effects on local government expenditure (Wyckoff, 1988). 
Nevertheless, empirical research has shown that local authorities tend to 
spend those transfers rather than to pass them to local residents in the 
form of tax cuts. In essence, this means that transfer money sticks where 
it hits, and four possible explanations for this phenomenon have been 
provided in the literature (Inman, 2008). The first possible explanation 
focuses on the data and states that intergovernmental transfers are miss-
measured, since matching grants tend to be equalised with lump-sum 
aid. Namely, the former has a price effect as it lowers the marginal price 
of public services, whereas the latter has an income effect.13 The second 
possible explanation sees the phenomenon basically as a consequence of 
econometric problem. Namely, the fly-paper effect should be the conse-
quence of miss-specifications of the technology and costs of providing 
services at the local level, which should occur due to the failure to correct-
11  In practice, the majority of European countries that have introduced financial 
equalisation plans equalise taxable resources per capita. Only few have adopted the so-
called Robin Hood approach, which refers to transferring the resources from relatively rich 
to relatively poor communities. This system tends to better preserve local autonomy, but 
it causes disincentive effects on tax base maximisation and tax collection efforts (more in 
Bailey, 1999).
12  This label was delivered by Okun (Hines and Thaler, 1995).
13  Nevertheless, several authors have stressed that fly-paper effect still remains, even 
if matching grants and aid programmes are correctly classified (see Wyckoff, 1991).
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ly validate the possibility of citizens’ exit from high tax jurisdictions. The 
third possible explanation focuses on the possibility of miss-specification 
of citizens’ fiscal choices, as citizens may not understand the complexity 
of grant programmes. Finally, the last possible explanation, and perhaps 
the most promising, sees the phenomenon as a consequence of politics. 
This explanation actually complements voter ignorance hypothesis in a 
sense that voters perceive budgetary effects of aids and grants, yet they 
allocate public and private money through separate »mental accounts«; 
public budget is taken as the responsibility of government and private 
budget as individual responsibility. Consequently, the fly-paper effect ex-
ists as a consequence of incentives of elected politicians and is thus influ-
enced by the political system.14
Theory has provided three distinct approaches to the explain fly-paper 
effect. The median voter theory argues that the fly-paper effect should 
be the result of mistakes in research methods, whereas Leviathan model 
of budget maximising behaviour contemplates that fly-paper is the result 
of local politicians using their monopoly power over budget information 
to increase their budgets, either to deceive voters for gaining support for 
larger expenditures or to hide the intergovernmental grants from voters 
(Bae and Feiock, 2004). Finally, the last approach is based on the concept 
of »fiscal illusion«, since citizens tend to ignore that intergovernmental 
transfers lower the real price for the provision of public goods at the lo-
cal level, which means that those funds could be implicitly refunded to 
them in the form of tax cuts (Sour and Giron, 2009). Thus, this concept 
predicts that the government actually produces the output demanded by 
the median voter, although this demand is based on miss-perceptions how 
the public goods are financed and what is their own share in bearing those 
costs of production (Widarjono, 2006).15
14  More in Hines and Thaler, 1995. Consequently, this explanation stresses that fly-
paper is not an anomaly but rather a reality of fiscal policies.
15  Actually, the fly-paper effect was one of the main concerns in the earlier literature 
on intergovernmental transfers. Modelling of the fly-paper effect has been based on various 
assumptions, such as voters facing fiscal illusion and absence of political competition, self-
interest of politicians and imperfections in the political system etc. Actually, the early litera-
ture has pointed three different hypotheses on the reasons for fly-paper effect: fiscal illusion 
hypothesis, monopolistic local government hypothesis and efficient government hypothesis. 
More recent literature supplements fly-paper effect with efficiency and equity considera-
tions, which are developed in various additional models that take into account soft budget 
constraints, fiscal competition, moral hazard etc. More on the literature review on the topic 
of fly-paper effect in Gamkhar and Shah, 2007.
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5.  A Brief Description of the Municipal Financing 
System in Slovenia
Currently, there are 212 municipalities in Slovenia.16 There are large dif-
ferences in the size of municipalities, and there is no intermediate level 
of local government (regions). Slovenia is a relatively centralised coun-
try, given the fact that approximately nine tenths of total government 
spending is allocated by the central government (Government Office for 
Local-Self Government and Regional Policy, 2006).17 According to the 
Local Self-Government Act (2007), municipalities perform local tasks of 
public interest in order to meet the needs of their residents. Specifically, 
municipalities manage the municipal assets and organise municipal ad-
ministration, develop conditions for economic development of the mu-
nicipality, provide spatial development plans and create conditions for 
housing, manage and regulate local public utilities and the provision of 
local public services, provide social services (in particular pre-school and 
primary school education, social, cultural and recreational activities etc.), 
organise local road maintenance, fire safety etc.18
The Act on Local Finances ZFO-1 (2006) stipulates that municipali-
ties finance their activities from the following resources: 35 per cent of 
personal income tax paid by municipal residents,19 inheritance and gift 
taxes, taxes on profits from lotteries and gaming, taxes on real estate busi-
ness transactions, administrative fees and duties, special tax on the use 
of slot machines outside casinos, property tax, compensation for the use 
of building land, local tourist taxes, municipal communal rates, various 
fees, indemnities due to a change of land use of agricultural land or for-
est, compensation and indemnity for the degradation and pollution of the 
environment, administrative revenue, and revenue defined by other acts. 
Local Self-Government Act (2007) stipulates that municipalities must 
raise their own revenue. Financially disadvantaged municipalities, unable 
to fully perform their duties, are eligible to receive additional financial 
16  The number of municipalities increased from 58 in 1995 to 212 in 2011. See, e.g., 
Vlaj (2004) on the description of local government system in Slovenia. 
17  See also, e.g., Dubajić (2011) on the discussion related to current issues in decen-
tralisation in Slovenia, such as the formation of regions etc.
18  See the Act for a detailed description of municipal tasks.
19  This source tends to be the most important one in practice (see Ministry of Fi-
nance, 2010).
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assistance from the state in accordance with the principles and criteria 
prescribed by the law.
The Act on Local Finances (1998) introduced a system of appropriate ex-
penditure in order to allow municipalities to carry out their constitutional 
and legal responsibilities. According to this system, appropriate expendi-
ture was calculated on the basis of a special equation, which included cor-
rectional factors for diversity in municipalities for the purpose of achieving 
the equalisations (in comparison to national average), such as the territo-
rial size of municipality, the number of residents, the number of residents 
aged below 15 and above 65 and the length of local roads.20 It needs to be 
stressed that this Law was amended by the Act on Local Finances ZFO-1 
(2006), which was subsequently introduced in 2007 fiscal year.21 
Basically, several problems of the old system were the reasons for amend-
ing the Act. For instance, the old system of financing fostered pressures 
for establishment of new municipalities, since the system of financing was 
particularly in favour of smaller municipalities as the principle of finan-
cial equalisation provided reasonable financial sources even for economi-
cally disadvantaged municipalities (Rop, 2006). Besides, relatively large 
differences in appropriate expenditure valuation between municipalities 
existed, combined with relatively large dependency on resources derived 
from income tax. This has ultimately led to overspending bias.
Furthermore, financial equalisation caused disincentive effects on the 
mobilisation of municipal own-source revenues, and it also provided 
disincentive effects on the promotion of developmental issues in mu-
nicipalities (Government Office of Local Self-Government and Regional 
Development, 2006). In essence, throughout the period 1999-2006, the 
number of self-financed municipalities substantially decreased, and con-
sequently only 17 municipalities did not receive financial equalisation in 
2006, which amounted to almost €190 million according to the Ministry 
20  See the source for the exact formula for the system of appropriate expenditure 
calculation.
21  Basically, the model of calculation of i-th municipality appropriate expenditure has 
been amended in the sense that weights of correctional factors have been changed and the 
average municipal costs per capita needed for financing of their tasks have been introduced 
as a basis for appropriate expenditure calculation instead of (national) appropriate expendi-
ture per capita, which was used in the previous system. See the law for the exact formula. 
Moreover, see Brezovnik, Oplotnik and Železnik (2006) for the simulations on the effect of 
old and new system of municipal financing. Given the fact, that the purpose of the paper 
is related to the verification of fly-paper effect, the financing system is not discussed more 
in detail.
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of Finance (2010) (see also Table 1 below). Financial autonomy of mu-
nicipalities almost disappeared, and the aim of the law amendment was 
to reduce the dependency of municipalities on financial equalisation in 
order to achieve their greater autonomy.






Financial equalisation  
(thousand EUR)
Municipalities not  
receiving  
financial equalisation1
2003 751.641 156.693 27
2004 779.394 161.667 24
2005 858.693 193.685 20
2006 899.385 186.306 17
2007 938.462 9.179 104
2008 976.240 10.169 103
2009 1.084.093 54.699 19
As it can be observed in Table 1, the new system substantially decreased 
the number of municipalities receiving financial equalisation as well as the 
total amount of financial equalisation. Nevertheless, the number of mu-
nicipalities receiving financial equalisation substantially increased again 
in 2009, which should be partially attributed to the economic slowdown, 
which was particularly severe in Slovenia. Namely, municipal financing 
largely depends on income tax as revenue source and this tax has a very 
important cyclical component. 
6. Research Design, Methodology and Findings
22  The source of data is the Ministry of Finance (2010). The data after 2007 were 
not directly comparable with the data before due to the stated changes in the system of 
appropriate expenditure calculation. Moreover, the data for 2003 were converted from SIT 
to EUR using average central bank exchange rate for 2003, whereas for 2004-2006 period 
central exchange rate was used.
720
Primož Pevcin: Fly-Paper Effect in Slovenian Municipal Finances
HKJU – CCPA, god. 11. (2011.), br. 3., str. 707–728
HKJU – CCPA
Numerous studies have tested the existence of fly-paper effect in local au-
thority financing.23 Consequently, the purpose of this study is to test the 
existence of fly-paper effect in the financing of Slovenian municipalities, 
in particular in those municipalities that have received financial equalisa-
tion from the central government. The empirical model is based on ex-
position given in Worthington and Dollery (1999) as well as in Amusa, 
Mabunda and Mabugu (2008), which specifies an expenditure function 
for the goods provided by the government as:
EXP = f (REV, TAXPRICE, NEEDS),
where EXP is the level of expenditure on goods provided by the govern-
ment, REV is the total amount of resources available for funding such 
expenditures, TAXPRICE describes the relative tax price of expenditures, 
and NEEDS defines institutional and other factors that effect municipal 
expenditure outcomes.
The following study uses municipal expenditure and revenue data for the 
2006 fiscal year for 193 Slovenian municipalities existing at that time.24 
In this study, the dependent variable, EXP, is the level of total municipal 
expenditures per capita by i-th municipality, which should be more ap-
propriate and comparable measure of provision of goods by municipal 
authorities, given the variations in the size of municipalities. In order to 
test the existence of fly-paper effect, variable REV is divided into two 
23  For example, see Hines and Thaler, 1995; Becker, 1996; Turnbull, 1998; Bailey 
and Connolly, 1998; Worthington and Dollery, 1999; Knight, 2002; Inman, 2008; Sour and 
Giron, 2009, just to name a few out of vast array of research in this field. For instance, In-
man (2008) reported that until 2008 more than 3,500 papers had been written dealing with 
the issue of fly-paper effect. Yet, it needs to be acknowledged that some studies were not 
able to confirm the validity of effect. For instance, Becker (1996) has even argued that fly-
paper effect is actually a statistical artefact, since inappropriate functional form of estima-
tion may generate the illusion of fly-paper effect presence. 
24  Cross-sectional data are used in the analysis, particularly in relation to 2006 fiscal 
year. There are several reasons for using those data: (1) several other existing empirical stud-
ies have used cross-sectional data (more in Amusa, Mabunda and Mabugu, 2008); (2) there 
are problems with achieving consistent time series data for Slovenian municipalities, given 
the fact that their number has risen constantly and substantially in the last 17 years, pre-
dominantly with devolutions of the existing municipalities; (3) fiscal year 2006 seemed to be 
a critical one, since in this year more than 90 per cent of all municipalities received financial 
equalisation from the central government, which meant that they were not able to finance 
municipal expenditures by themselves (ultimately, this led to the amendments to the Act on 
Local Finances); (4) given the previous observation, data from 2007 onwards, in particular 
for financial equalisation, could not be directly compared with the data from previous years 
due to the aforementioned amendments.
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distinct components: (1) grant money per capita for i-th municipality 
(with this purpose, two distinct variables are used in the analysis: finan-
cial equalisation and total revenues of municipalities received through 
intergovernmental transfers); (2) income per capita,25 which relates to 
idea that available income should be the other important prerequisite for 
municipal spending. Another explanatory variable is TAXPRICE, which 
describes relative tax price of goods and services provided by municipali-
ties, and should describe the ability of municipalities to derive revenues 
from the assigned tax bases. As a proxy for describing relative tax price, 
sources consisting of tax, non-tax and capital revenues of municipalities 
are used, since they reflect the ability of municipalities to collect revenues 
on their own. Finally, the variable NEEDS describes the assessed expend-
iture need of the i-th municipality, and denotes its ability to meet the de-
mands for the provision of local public goods. Basically, the expenditures 
on administrative operation, public utilities and education are used as a 
proxy for describing the core functions of municipalities, and they are 
all expressed in per capita terms.26 Descriptive statistics of the variables 
included in the analysis is presented in Table 2.












 Mean  835  1116  203  276  482  504
 Median  783  1100  193  252  453  492
 Std. Dev.  287  138  108  179  200  156
 N  193  193  170  193  193  193
The results of the empirical analysis are presented in Table 3 below. In 
Model 1, the existence of fly-paper effect is investigated with the use of 
25  Gross average monthly salary per employed person in i-th municipality is used as 
proxy for describing per capita income, since those data are available also at the municipal 
level.
26  The expenditures for local public utilities, education and administrative operation 
are the most important expenditures of municipalities in Slovenia, since the provision of 
those services and functions is particularly in the municipal domain. 
27  Sources of data are Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia (2011) for the 
variable Income; and Faculty of Administration (2009) for other variables used in the analy-
sis, related to municipal revenues and expenditures. 
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data on financial equalisation, whereas in Model 2 the existence of fly-
paper effect is investigated with the use of data on total intergovernmen-
tal transfers, obtained by individual municipality. The results obviously 
indicate that the existence of fly-paper effect could be observed, since the 
semi-elasticity of financial equalisation is greater than the semi-elasticity 
of income regarding their effect on total municipal expenditures, not to 
mention the fact that the value of the income coefficient is even not sta-
tistically significant in either of the models. Similarly, the semi-elasticity 
in Model 2 also indicates the larger effect of transfers on total munici-
pal expenditures compared to income (coefficient is also not statistically 
significant). Furthermore, the effect of grant money is also larger than 
the effect of municipal own-source revenues in both instances, as both 
semi-elasticity coefficients tend to be larger. It should also be mentioned 
that this method helps to explain approximately one third to two fifths 
of variance in the total municipal expenditures per capita, which is lower 
than expected, although we should recognise that Slovenian municipali-
ties tend to be very diverse, so the results of cross-sectional modelling 
seem to be reasonably acceptable.
Table 3: Modelling the fly-paper effect in Slovenian municipalities28
Dependent var.
Explanatory var.
Total municipal  
expenditures per capita
(1)













Grant money  











28  Log-linear regression models are estimated, since they tend to be structurally 
stable in both instances. Namely, log-linear model is not structurally stable for Model 2, 
whereas linear model is not stable for estimation 1. Notwithstanding, results do not vary 
considerably regardless of he model being used. Furthermore, given the revealed presence 
of heteroscedasticity, t-values include White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors 
(standard errors and values of t statistics are in parentheses; *** means p<0.001).
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Durbin-Watson d 2.11 1.86
Ramsey (p) 0.235 0.054
F-stat (sig.) 22.57 (0.000) 34.09 (0.000)
8. Conclusion 
The purpose of the study presented in the paper is related to the inves-
tigation of fly-paper effect in municipal financing in Slovenia. Namely, 
the issue of fly-paper effect has been widely addressed in literature and is 
nowadays not taken as an anomaly in public finances anymore, but rather 
as the existing effect. Basically, this effect states that intergovernmental 
transfers, which tend to be used as a source of revenue for financially 
disadvantaged municipalities, tend to have greater effect on municipal 
expenditures than the equivalent increase in available income. The results 
of the analysis performed for Slovenian municipalities for 2006 fiscal year 
tend to support the existence of the effect in Slovenian municipal financ-
ing. Consequently, transfers should also inflate the total municipal expen-
ditures. This issue should be addressed further, in particular in empirical 
research, as the existence of the effect is indicative of the inefficiencies in 
municipal expenditure system management.
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Fly-PaPer eFFect In SlovenIan  
MunIcIPal FInanceS
Summary
Decentralization is a contemporary concept of administrative reform, which in 
practice denotes a process of transferring resources and administrative powers 
to the lower levels of government, with the anticipated effect of the increase in 
efficiency of the provision of goods and services. However, it should be acknowl-
edged that issues related to the appropriate creation of local jurisdictions and 
their financing system are also very important in achieving efficiency gains relat-
ed to decentralisation. namely, decentralization also has potential negative ef-
fects, one of them being associated with inappropriate financing system causing 
fly-paper effect. local authorities’ own-source revenues may not be sufficient to 
finance the provision of services that certain authority is obliged to deliver. this 
provides a rationale for central government to pay transfers to the lower levels of 
government in order to prevent either too low level of service provision at the local 
level or to prevent local taxes from being too high. the most common example of 
transfers is associated with the concept of financial equalisation. one of the po-
tentially negative effects of financial equalisation is the so-called fly-paper effect, 
which denotes a phenomenon of intergovernmental transfers, in particular from 
the central to the lower levels of government, inflating local government expendi-
tures. empirical findings have shown that lump-sum transfers of central govern-
ment tend to have greater stimulatory effect on local government spending than 
the equivalent increase in the income of the median voter. In essence, this means 
that transfer money »sticks where it hits«. Financial equalisation tended to be 
very important revenue source for Slovenian municipalities, as their own-source 
revenues were not sufficient to finance the provision of local goods and services, 
since in some fiscal years around 90 per cent of those municipalities received it. 
the results of an analysis performed for Slovenian municipalities for 2006 fiscal 
year, tend to support the existence of the effect in municipal financing.
Key words: decentralisation, local authorities, local public finance, intergov-
ernmental transfers, financial equalisation, fly-paper effect, Slovenian munici-
palities 
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eFeKt MuHolovKe u SlovenSKIM loKalnIM  
FInancIjaMa
Sažetak
Decentralizacija je suvremeni koncept upravne reforme koji znači proces 
prenošenja sredstava i upravnih ovlasti nižim razinama vlasti. očekivani mu 
je učinak povećanje učinkovitosti u pružanju javnih dobara i usluga. obliko-
vanje djelokruga lokalnih samoupravnih jedinica te lokalnog financijskog sus-
tava važno je radi postizanja takvog učinka decentralizacije. Decentraliza-
cija može, naime, imati i negativne učinke, među koje se ubraja i neadekvatni 
sustav lokalnih financija koji uzrokuje efekt muholovke. Sredstva iz vlastitih 
prihoda mogu biti nedovoljna za financiranje usluga koje bi određene lokalne 
vlasti trebale pružati. takvo stanje daje osnove središnjoj vlasti da daje subven-
cije lokalnim jedinicama radi sprečavanja da razina lokalnih usluga padne 
ispod određene razine ili radi sprečavanja uvođenja previsokih lokalnih poreza. 
najčešći primjer transfera povezan je s konceptom financijskog poravnanja. 
jedan od potencijalno negativnih učinaka financijskog poravnanja je tzv. efekt 
muholovke, takva pojava u sustavu financijskih transfera među različitim razi-
nama vlasti, naročito kod transfera sa središnje razine na lokalne jedinice, koja 
povećava potrošnju lokalnih vlasti. empirijska istraživanja pokazuju da trans-
feri nenamjenskih subvencija (lump-sum) od središnje prema lokalnoj razini 
imaju veći stimulirajući učinak na trošenje od strane lokalnih jedinica nego 
ekvivalentni rast dohotka prosječnog glasača. u osnovi, to znači da se subven-
cije »lijepe tamo gdje padaju«. Financijsko poravnanje se pokazuje vrlo važnim 
izvorom prihoda slovenskih jedinica lokalne samouprave, budući da njihovi pri-
hodi iz vlastitih izvora nisu dovoljni da bi financirale pružanje lokalnih dobara 
i usluga – u određenim je fiskalnim godinama čak oko 90 posto jedinica lokalne 
samouprave primalo subvencije temeljem financijskog poravnanja. rezultati 
analize provedene za 2006. fiskalnu godinu podupiru zaključak da postoji 
efekt muholovke u financiranju jedinica lokalne samouprave u Sloveniji.
Ključne riječi: decentralizacija, lokalne vlasti, lokalne javne financije, finan-
cijski transferi među razinama vlasti, financijsko poravnanje, efekt muholovke, 
jedinice lokalne samouprave u Sloveniji
